Series A · circadian performance systems V3LA One — clinical validation underway
Investors · Series A closed · Series B 2028

A category the incumbents
are structurally unable
to serve.

Every large wearable company models a diurnal user and monetises a general-purpose subscription. Serving irregular schedules properly takes a different sensor set, a different estimator, and a second buyer who already carries the cost of fatigue.

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$6.4M
Series A, closed
1,900
Pilot participants
74%
Day-90 retention
4
Health-system LOIs

Why this, why now

The population

27 million people, designed for by nobody.

Shift and irregular-schedule workers are not a niche inside the wearable market — they are the segment every incumbent under-serves, because a diurnal model is baked into the product's core assumptions.

Roughly one in five US workers is on a non-standard schedule.
Healthcare alone accounts for over five million night and rotating staff.
Fatigue is estimated to cost US employers around $136B a year.
Addressable population, US
All shift & irregular workers27.0M
Healthcare, nights & rotating5.4M
Already wearable-owning3.1M
Pilot-qualified today0.9M
The wedge

A measurement they can't ship in an update.

Phase estimation needs continuous distal temperature with ambient compensation. That is a hardware decision made at design time, and it trades directly against the optical sensing incumbents have already committed to.

±19 min median error against lab DLMO in a 68-participant pilot.
Nine-day battery precisely because we removed PPG.
On-device inference — no server cost per active user.
Where competitors sit
V3LA — phase-firstTemp + IMU
Premium ringsPPG-first
SmartwatchesPPG + apps
Phone-only trackersMotion only
Why now

The components got cheap; the science got settled.

Low-power thermistors, BLE 5.4 and small batteries are commodity. The circadian literature on temperature-derived phase is mature enough to build on without inventing the science first.

Sensing bill of materials is under $40 at pilot volume.
Health systems are actively budgeting for fatigue-risk programmes.
Enterprise buyers now expect on-device privacy by default.
Cost and readiness index
Sensing BOM vs 2019−63%
Published phase-from-temp studies3.4×
Health-system fatigue budgetsGrowing
Regulatory friction (wellness)Low
Traction

Pilot base, quarter by quarter

Growth has been entirely word of mouth inside units — no paid acquisition to date, which is both the encouraging part and the unproven part.

74%
Day-90 retention
0
Paid acquisition
1.9×
Referral coefficient
40
Q2 25
180
Q3 25
460
Q4 25
910
Q1 26
1,520
Q2 26
1,900
Q3 26

Cumulative pilot participants. Unaudited; Q3 2026 is partial.

Unit economics

Hardware pays for itself. Software compounds.

The ring is priced to cover its own landed cost and fulfilment at modest volume, so subscription margin isn't subsidising a loss-leading device.

Device price / landed cost$249 / $96
Subscription ARPU$11.40 / mo
Software gross margin88%
Blended CAC (target)$74
Payback4.1 months
Enterprise seat, annual$180 / seat
Use of Series A — $6.4M
Hardware, tooling & certification$2.4M
Science & validation studies$1.7M
Software & on-device modelling$1.4M
Enterprise go-to-market$0.9M

Runway to Q4 2028 at current burn, before revenue contribution.

The thesis

Four lines, in order of importance

01
The market is large and structurally ignored

Roughly one in five US workers is on a shift schedule. Every mainstream wearable models them as a broken day-shift user and tells them their sleep score is bad.

02
The wedge is a measurement, not a feature

Circadian phase can't be added by software update — it needs continuous distal temperature, which no major ring or watch prioritises today.

03
There are two buyers, and the second pays more

Individuals buy the ring. Health systems and industrial operators buy fatigue-risk reduction, and already carry the cost of not having it.

04
Wellness now, regulated later

Launching as a general wellness product puts no clearance gate on revenue, while the pilot base compounds into the evidence a clinical indication would need.

The risks, stated plainly

We would rather you hear these from us than find them in diligence.

Retention past month three

Where most wellness products bleed out. Our cohorts hold at 74% at day 90; that number is small-n and we treat it as a hypothesis, not a result.

Hardware is unforgiving

Tooling, yield and certification cost time we can't compress. We mitigate by shipping one SKU and refusing feature creep before GA.

Incumbent entry

A large player could add temperature-based phase estimation. Our defence is depth in one population and enterprise relationships they are slow to build.

Enterprise sales cycles

Health systems move in budget years. Consumer revenue exists partly so the enterprise timeline can't kill us.

Acquisition channel unproven

Everything to date is word of mouth inside units. Paid acquisition at a $74 CAC is a target, not an observed number.

Key-person concentration

The founder and Head of Science hold most of the domain credibility with pilot units. Hiring the science bench out is the explicit mitigation.

Backed by

Northlight Ventures
Series A lead
Health-hardware focus, one board seat. Led both the pre-seed and the A.
Meridian Seed
Seed · followed on
First cheque into the company, back when it was a spreadsheet and a thermistor.
Halden Health Fund
Seed · followed on
Brought the first two health-system introductions that became LOIs.
The Nightside Syndicate
22 angels
Clinicians, pilots and plant supervisors — most of them shift workers themselves.

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Current materials: validation summary, unit economics, enterprise pipeline and the full risk register.

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Figures on this page are unaudited and describe pilot-stage operations. Nothing here is an offer to sell securities.